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FORUM

the criminal act, and a principal in the second degree being one
who, while actually or constructively present, aids or abets the
commission of the act but does not himself commit it. It was
thus the element of presence or absence which effectively determined whether a given party was to be classified as a principal or as an accessory under the common law. Historically, this
accessory-principal distinction benefited those charged as accessories in several ways: (1) accessories were distinguished as
such in the indictment and were therefore given notice of the
nature and seriousness of the charges against them, (2) acces
sories, in most cases, were allowed the benefit of clergy and (3)
accessories could not be tried until after the principal was con
victed.
Although Mrs. Williamson's contention that she could not
have been convicted of first degree murder because the state
did not establish her constructive presence at the scene of the
crime raised the question of the applicability of the common law
distinctions between principal and accessory to Maryland case
law, the Court of Appeals found it unnecessary to determine
whether these common law distinctions are still in effect in
Maryland. According to the narrow holding of the court, Mrs.
Williamson "having been indicted for the murder of her husband in a form which permitted proof either that she was a
principal or an accessory, and the evidence adduced having
been sufficient to convict her as an accessory before the fact,
there was no error.
The interesting aspect of Williamson is not so much the
narrow disposition of the case itself, but rather what it might
have been had a majority squarely faced those very issues
which it successfully avoided. Had the express language of
§616 (a) not provided the necessary grounds for upholding
Mrs. Williamson's conviction, the Court of Appeals might have
been able to take advantage of the opportunity to lift the
burdens which the common law distinctions continue to
impose upon Maryland criminal courts. As outlined briefly in
the concurring opinion to Williamson, under this common law
view, accessories could be tried only in the jurisdiction where
the act of accessoryship was committed, without regard to
where the felony itself was committed; if the principal was
acquitted or never discovered, the accessory could never be
brought to trial; and one charged as a principal cannot be
convicted as an accessory if the evidence shows only that he
had acted as an accessory before the fact. The opinion
suggests as well that the constitutional restraints upon the use
of the death penalty in recent years have rendered void the historical foundations upon which the common law distinctions
were originally founded. Maryland is indeed the only state
which has not modified the common law in some respect; all
other jurisdictions have to some extent taken measures (either
by statutory enactment or by judicial decision) to erase the restrictions which the common law of parties to crime had
imposed upon them. For the most part this has been accom
plished without any noticeable detrimental effect on the rights
of defendants and to the added benefits of judicial efficiency
and, to some extent, simplicity.
There is, however, no indication either in Williamson or in
any preceding case that the common law rules have been
modified in Maryland at all, and it seems, therefore that the
doctrine of accessoryship continues to remain the law in
Maryland. This will be the case until either legislation or a
Court of Appeals decision finally inters this persistent remnant from our legal past. Perhaps the needlessness of the doctrine is best summarized by a passage from Bishop's Criminal
Law as quoted in the concurring opinion to Williamson:
"This distinguishing of the accessory before the fact from
the principal is a pure technicality. It has no existence either in

natural reason or the ordinary doctrines of the law. For in
natural reason the procurer of a crime is not chargeable differently from the doer; and a familiar rule of the common law is
that what one does through another's agency is regarded as
done by himself.
-James F. Kuhn

Licensee, Invitee and

Trespasser:
Archaic Classes?
In a 5-2 decision, the Court of Appeals decided that the
abolition of the common law classifications of invitee, licensee
and trespasser in considering the liability of a property owner
was not properly preserved for appeal. The majority in
Sherman u. Suburban Trust Company, 282 Md. 238, 384 A.2d
76 (1978), asserted that they were precluded from considering
the question because of Plaintiff's failure to request a jury
instruction specifically predicating the tort liability of an owner
or occupier of land upon principles of ordinary negligence as
opposed to the technical classifications of invitee, licensee, and
trespasser. The dissenting opinion, however, asserted that the
issue was proper and that the common law distinctions should
be abolished.
In this case, the Court of Appeals was confronted with the
question of whether the property owner owed a duty to a police
officer injured on a nonpublic segment of an owner's premises
while in his official capacity.
The plaintiff, a plainclothes policeman on patrol, received a
radio call that an attempt was being made to negotiate a forged
check at the Suburban Trust Company (defendant). After
identifying himself and another to the bank teller, he and his
fellow officer were permitted to enter the six by eight foot
teller's cage. The teller accidentally dropped the alleged forged
check onto the floor. Attempting to pick up the check, the
Plaintiff stepped back two or three feet. As he did so the officer
struck part of his body on the coin changing machine's scoop
arm, which he did not see.
The plaintiff in this case sued the Bank claiming in part that
the defendant ". . failed to give adequate warning of its (the
coin changing machine's) placement and further placed it in a
negligent position where it could cause injury to individuals..."
The plaintiff excepted to the Circuit Court's jury instruction
and claimed that a police officer was either an invitee or in a
class sui generis, and was not a licensee. The plaintiff sought an
instruction that would give the Bank an affirmative duty both to
excercise ordinary care to keep the premises reasonably safe
for him and to refraiti from negligence.
According to the present law in Maryland, the liability of a
property owner to an injured party is dependent upon whether
the latter is an invitee, licensee or trespasser. After the injured
party is classified, the courts then apply the appropriate
standard of care.
In Maryland, a trespasser is generally one who enters or remains upon land of another without privilege to do so. The tres
passer takes the property as he finds it in so far as any alleged
defective condition may exist on the property. The possessor
of the land owes him only the duty of refraining from wanton or
wilfull injury. Duff u. U.S., 171 F.2d 846 (4th Cir. 1949).
A licensee is a person who enters the property with the
knowledge and consent of the owner and for the licensee's own

purpose. Peregoy u. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 202 Md. 203,
95 A.2d 867 (1953). The only duty the occupier of the land owes
to a licensee is that if he becomes aware of the licensee's presence he must not injure him wilfully or wantonly or entrap him.
Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 287 A.2d 265 (1972).
An invitee is one who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on another's property for purposes connected with or related to the owner's business. The property owner must use
reasonable care to keep his premises safe for the invitee and to
protect him from harm caused by an unreasonable risk, which
the invitee will not discover even when ordinary care is
excercised on part of the invitee. Gray u. Sentinel Auto Parks
Co., 265 Md. 61, 288 A.2d 121 (1972); Lloyd v. Bowles, 260 Md.
568, 273 A.2d 193 (1971).
Traditionally, policemen have been held in most jurisdictions
to be licensees. The rationale for this classification is that they
are likely to enter at unforeseeable times, upon unusual parts of
the premises and during emergencies. The authorities state
that placing a duty upon the property owner to keep his premises reasonably safe would be too severe.
The plaintiff in this case advanced two principle arguments.
First, he asserted that the licensee status given him had
changed to invitee after the initial period of his anticipated occupational risk had passed. That is, when the suspects had
been apprehended. The court was of the opinion, however,
that the plaintiff was injured during, and not after, the initial
period of his anticipated occupational risk and from a hazard
reasonably foreseeable as a part of that risk. Therefore, the
plaintiff was not afforded the invitee status.
The plaintiff's second argument was that Maryland should
abolish the common law classifications of invitee, licensee and
trespasser and instead hold the property owners to a general
negligence standard of ordinary reasonable care.
The trend now exists where courts have either abandoned in
part or in whole the common law status classifications. The
trend's driving force began in Rowland v. Christian,69 Cal.2d
108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Ca. Rptr. 97 (1968), where the common
law classifications were rejected. The court stated that:
"A man's life or limb does not become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of compensation under
the law because he has come upon the land of another without permission or with permission but without a business
purpose. Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus upon the
status of the injured party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee
in order to determine the question whether the landowner
has a duty of care, is contrary to our modern social mores
and humanitarian values."
69 Cal. 2d 118, 443 P.2d 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 104.
Instead of using the standard of classifications the California
Court found the proper test to be:
"whether in the management of his property he has acted as
a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to
others, and although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to
such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the
status is not determinative."
Id. at 119, 443 P.2d 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. 104.
In Woodward u. Newstein, 37 Md.App. 285, 377 A.2d 535
(1977), The Maryland Court of Special Appeals took note of
the modern trend of cases that would abolish the classes of in-

vitee, licensee, and trespassers. In that case the Court declined
to rule on the merits of the new wave of cases as the question
was not properly raised in the Court below. The court further
noted that the Court of Appeals should bear the burden of
deciding the issue.
The dissent by Judge Levine, in which Judge Eldridge
joined, strongly urged the abolition of the common law classification status in exchange for the acceptance of general
negligence as the standard of care for the property owner. The
dissent stated that the common law approach was necessary to
protect a landowner's right to free use and enjoyment of his
property, but now, society's interest in the safety of people outweighs its interest in the property owner's unrestricted use of
his premises. Applying the common law classification generally
results in the inordinately severe treatment of the injured entrants. The distinctions between the classifications is inconsistent with contemporary thinking about the function of tort law
in society. The dissent argues that the traditional rule affords a
property owner a special privilege to be careless.
It is only a matter of time before this jurisdiction imposes
upon landowners a duty not to create unreasonable risks of
harm to persons entering upon their premises. The dissenting
opinion suggests that the standard of care would depend upon
such factors as: (1) The likelihood that the conduct in question
will result in harm to others; (2) The gravity of such harm; and
(3) The cost of preventing the risks of injury.
Resolution of the issue presented here must wait for another
day. When that day arrives, and the issue is properly presented, the Maryland Court will probably abandon the old
common law status of invitee, licensee, and trespasser and
apply instead the standard of ordinary negligence in determining the liability of landowners to persons injured on their property.
-Ronald Frank Greenbaum

Unreasonably Dangerous
Products in Strict Tort
Liability: The Search for a
Standard
In products liability design defect cases, in order for a seller
to be strictly liable under Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, it generally must be shown that: (1) the
product was in a defective condition at the time it left the
possession or control of the seller; (2) that it was unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer; (3) that the defect was a
cause of the injuries; and (4) that the product was expected to
and did reach the consumer without substantial change in its
condition.
California, however, holds otherwise. In Barker v. Lull
Engineering Company, Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978), the Supreme Court of California restated
its elimination of the unreasonably dangerous requirement,
and further held that a trial judge may properly instruct the jury
that a product is defective in design if (1) the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended and
reasonably foreseeable manner, or if (2) the plaintiff proves that
the product's design proximately caused his injury and the
defendant fails to prove that, on balance, the benefits of the

